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The DJI Phantom III drone has already been used for malicious activities (to drop bombs, remote sur-
veillance and plane watching) in 2016 and 2017. At the time of writing, DJI was the drone manufacturer
with the largest market share. Our work presents the primary thorough forensic analysis of the DJI
Phantom III drone, and the primary account for proprietary ﬁle structures stored by the examined drone.
It also presents the forensically sound open source tool DRone Open source Parser (DROP) that parses
proprietary DAT ﬁles extracted from the drone's nonvolatile internal storage. These DAT ﬁles are
encrypted and encoded. The work also shares preliminary ﬁndings on TXT ﬁles, which are also pro-
prietary, encrypted, encoded, ﬁles found on the mobile device controlling the drone. These ﬁles provided
a slew of data such as GPS locations, battery, ﬂight time, etc. By extracting data from the controlling
mobile device, and the drone, we were able to correlate data and link the user to a speciﬁc device based
on extracted metadata. Furthermore, results showed that the best mechanism to forensically acquire data
from the tested drone is to manually extract the SD card by disassembling the drone. Our ﬁndings
illustrated that the drone should not be turned on as turning it on changes data on the drone by creating
a new DAT ﬁle, but may also delete stored data if the drone's internal storage is full.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)s, also known as drones, have
become increasingly popular in recent years, largely due to the
rapid increase in affordability for the average consumer. They are
no longer expensive machines (less than $1000) and can often be
controlled with ease, e.g., utilizing a smart phone application for
direct control or feedback.
Da-Jiang Innovations Science and Technology (DJI), a Chinese
company, acquired success in the consumer drone market. DJI is
one of the most prominent drone manufacturers today. A droneli-
fe.com article reports a revenue jump from $4.2 million in 2011 to
$130 million in 2013. An estimated 533,400 drones have been sold
between their initial launch and the end of 2014 (Amato, 2015). DJI
produces two primary aircraft models, the Phantom series and
Inspire series. This work focused on the forensic analysis of the
Phantom III Standard, launched in April of 2015.
With this increase in popularity, the need for laws regarding
the use of drones has also increased. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has reported 583 drone incidents from
August 2015 to January 2016. These incidents usually involved
curious or mischievous pilots ﬂying their drones into restricted
airspace. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been asked
to investigate rogue drones, with the most challenging task being
the tracking of pilot fault, according to Brandom (2016). To keep
up with technology, the FAA has been working to develop laws to
constrain the use of recreational UAVs. These laws mostly limit the
maximum altitude and impose no-ﬂy zones for airports and other
areas such as recreational sporting events with more than 30,000
people.
Drones have also had an impact on terrorism activities. For
example, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been
using drones for surveillance purposes for some time now as
Schmidt (2016) points out. Furthermore, there have been three
recorded incidents (one fatal) of ISIL rigging the drones with
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explosives. The terrorist group is not using military grade aircrafts,
but rather they are resorting to commercially available drones
which include the DJI Phantom series, the very same series
investigated in this work. Due to the growth in popularity of
commercial UAVs along with the spike in criminal activity
involving them, there is a dire need for the development of sound
UAV forensic techniques. We posit that this need will continue to
increase as UAVs become more accessible and employed in other
criminal activities.
To the best of our knowledge, we present the ﬁrst comprehen-
sive work on the forensic analysis of the DJI Phantom III Standard
drone. Our contribution in this work is as follows:
 We present a set of procedures that examiners may learn from
during the process of investigating a case that involves the DJI
Phantom III Standard drone.
 We present the ﬁrst openly accessible account for the binary
(FLYXXX.dat) ﬁle structure e the ﬂight recording ﬁle created by
the drone and stored on its SD card.
 We compile our ﬁndings into the only available open source
python tool called DRone Open source Parser (DROP) capable of
parsing the proprietary DAT ﬁle format in a forensically sound
manner. This tool is available for download at https://github.
com/unhcfreg/DROP.
 We provide the ﬁrst account, tool, and method for being able to
correlate data extracted from the drone's nonvolatile internal
storage and the mobile device used to control it.
We ﬁrst start the paper by stating the scope of our research
(Section Research scope). We then review previous work related to
UAV forensics in Section Related work. This is followed by the
methodology and process used to conduct the forensic analysis of
the Phantom III in Section Methodology. In Section Data analysis,
we present the analysis of data acquired from ourmethodology and
illustrate the drone's proprietary ﬁle structures, and a tool used to
parse one of them in Section Tool creation: DRone Open source
Parser (DROP). Next, we discuss the results obtained from our
analysis in Section Testing and ﬁndings. Section Limitations dis-
cusses the limitations associated with our work and DROP. Finally,
our concluding thoughts are shared in Section Conclusions& future
work. We assert that one limitation of our work in this paper is that
it encompasses just the DJI Phantom III Standard model. Further
efforts to extend the research to additional DJI models and other
manufacturers may be addressed in future work.
Research scope
It is important to note that the scope of this work is limited to
the DJI Phantom III standard drone. While it would be ideal to test a
multitude of drones, the work is rather tedious and requires plenty
of reverse engineering. It is also of note that the idea of imple-
menting a generalized solution that would be capable the forensic
analysis of all the drones available on the consumer market is a
strenuous exercise. Each drone is different in terms of its operating
system, proprietary data storage, and control protocols making the
task for forensic examiners difﬁcult. Whilewe dive deep into the DJI
Phantom III, we argue that this is a good start given that DJI
currently holds the highest market share in the Drone market, and
the fact that their Drones have already been used by terrorism
groups such as ISIL.
Related work
The following sections review several developing areas in digital
forensics relevant to drone forensics.
Drone forensics/security
In the process of researching this topic, modest peer reviewed
related literature was identiﬁed. Much of the literature at the time
of writing focused on the security of drones.
Samland et al. (2012) outlined a detailed analysis using the
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) taxonomy. The CERT
taxonomy is a common language by which security related in-
cidents are discussed by experts (Kiltz et al., 2007). By leveraging
this taxonomy, Samland et al. (2012) were able to identify potential
vulnerabilities. They conducted studies based on three different
scenarios: high-jacking the drone; malicious code delivery to the
drone; and using the drone's GPS system to track the end user. In
each scenario, they shared the particular systems and level of
compromise to those systems needed to execute each scenario.
Furthermore, they identiﬁed protection requirements to help pre-
vent their discovered attacks.
In other work, a presentation by Kovar (2015) discussed the
forensic analysis of the DJI Phantom II, the precursor to the Phan-
tom III. He noted the new wave of illegal activity involving drones
which included drug and weapon delivery, invasion of privacy,
ﬂight in controlled airspace, and ﬂight into bystanders. In his
analysis, he was able to recover a plethora of data to trace the
aircraft back to the owner. This included GPS and other EXIF data
from pictures, launch point, DJI account information, and the
owner's name. The work also showed that practitioners can
establish a Secure Shell (SSH) connection to the drone and dump
the root ﬁle system and hijack it in real-time using a tool called
Skyjack by Kamkar (2013). Although theworkwas similar to ours 1)
The work did not focus on the Phantom III and 2) A validated
forensic methodology and tool was not the focus of the work.
Another presentation by Luo (2016) was shared at DEFCON. This
presentation portrayed a detailed security analysis of the DJI
Phantom III e the drone used in our work. In the work, Aaron Lou
broke down the security analysis into several parts which included:
breaking the Software Development Kit (SDK) authentication,
ﬁrmware analysis, radio signal analysis, and GPS analysis. In each of
these, he brieﬂy identiﬁed possible compromises as well as solu-
tions. This work focused on the security analysis of the DJI Phantom
III and did not focus on the forensics of the drone.
In other recent work, Horsman (2016) discussed a preliminary
analysis of forensic challenges for UAVs. The paper presented a
forensic analysis of the Parrot Bebop UAV, another popular drone
consumer model. The results demonstrated the ability to recover
ﬂight data from both the drone and the controller handset. Prob-
lems still existed however for establishing ownership of the drone.
Similar to David Kovar's analysis of the Phantom II, the researcher
was able to connect remotely via Telnet and acquire an image of the
root ﬁle system.
Thiobane (2015) recognizes that the increased use of drones by
private citizens escalates the challenges faced by digital forensic
investigators. Among other ﬁndings, they identiﬁed that drones are
targeted by criminals for their payload value, data breach, and cyber-
attack capabilities. Several recommendations were made which
include creating an academic course to keep Information Technol-
ogy (IT) and forensic examiners up-to-date on developments in UAV
usage. They also proposed that drone manufacturers develop built-
in technology to locate hijacked, stolen, and ﬂyaway drones.
As shown from the literature review on drone forensics, peer
reviewedwork on the forensic analysis of the DJI Phantom Drone III
had not been published at the time of writing. Our work improves
the state of the art by ﬁlling that research gap by both presenting
our ﬁndings, as well as enabling investigators to forensically
analyze proprietary ﬁles to recover a slew of digital evidence from
the tested drone.
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Legal challenges of drones
Amajor challenge that follows civilian drone usage is privacy. The
concerns of the public are a result of cases inwhich the drone is used
to take photo or video of a person unaware of the drone. The case for
regulating law enforcement drone usage will not be nearly as much
of a challenge as the use of drones by civilians. There is a need to
strike a balance betweenwhat is acceptable for private use andwhat
is not. Currently, there are laws being created both by state and
federal agencies. Many of these laws revolve around the ﬁrst and
fourth amendments. In particular, the need to know the location of
the dronewhen it is recording is critical for privacy (Kaminski, 2013).
Work conducted by Carver (2014) dives into the details of laws
against drones at the state level. Some states are simply banning
them outright while others are more focused onwhat is allowed and
what is not. One example being laws against drones carrying
weapons. The state of Connecticut has proposed a law to restrict/
prohibit putting guns on drones after a man posted a video of his
drone ﬂyingwith a gun and shooting according to (Rondinone, 2015).
Ravich (2015) built a detailed analysis of the challenges faced by
the courts in relation to drones. Drones are not simply ﬂying ma-
chines, but contain information. With so much data capable of
being collected with these devices it becomes critical to identify
what can or cannot be used in a court of law. A case is made that
data acquired via a drone should be as valid as data collected via
any other aerial observation tool, as well as any digital item (mobile
phones, smart watches, etc).
Clarke and Moses (2014) pointed out that in both the United
States and Australia, there are no recorded collisions with civilian
drones and air transportation. There has, however, been cases of
pilots identifying these types of drones in airspace that makes up
airports such as the Perth airport. As of April 17 2016 there has been
a recorded incident of a drone striking a British Airways aircraft
landing in Heathrow airport (Wild et al., 2016).
In terms of military drones, in 2005 there were two collisions
involving drones and aircrafts while in Iraq. According to Zenko
(2012), there has been 79 crashes of drones as of 2010 in the
United States Air Force.
Phantom III related ﬁles and software tools
Previous research found that the DJI Phantom III has two pro-
prietary ﬁle formats: binary ﬁles (located on the drone's nonvolatile
internal storagewith the “.dat” ﬁle extension) and additional binary
ﬁles (located on the Android device with the “.txt” ﬁle extension
used to control the drones). From this point forward, we will refer
to the binary “.dat” ﬁles as “DAT ﬁles” and “.txt” ﬁles are referred to
as “TXT ﬁles.” Both of these ﬁles are encoded and encrypted
(therefore the TXT ﬁle is not in the standard ASCII format). At the
time of writing, some tools were available for parsing these ﬁles.
We would like to point out that these tools were not forensic tools,
but were created by hackers and hobbyists.
DatCon,1 which is written in Javawas the only tool found capable
of parsing DAT ﬁles. It is unclear who the inventors/authors are as
they remained anonymous. Three tools were identiﬁed for TXT
ﬁles. First, dji-log-parser by Franklin (2016), is an open source tool
that operates locally in a browser. It was only able to parse data
from an older TXT ﬁle format, however, it failed with the newer
format. Secondly, CsvView2 was found which is closed source and
had the same problem. Lastly, there was Healthy Drones3 which is a
free online service to convert TXT ﬁles to CSV ﬁles. Unfortunately,
the authors did not release any information on how they were able
to extract the data. Additionally, an examiner would have to up-
load/share evidence with an unknown service provider which is
clearly a drawback. e On p. 3, the paper states e It is also worth
noting that our research focused on the analysis of the mobile
device connecting to the drone with the hope that data between
the drone and the controller may be correlated. This sentence gave
the impression that the research did not focus on the analysis of
data onboard the Drone, which seems to not be the case. This
sentence should be removed or clariﬁed.
It is also worth noting that our research included the analysis of
the mobile device connecting to the drone with the hope that data
between the drone and the controller may be correlated.
Methodology
The apparatus used throughout this research is presented in
Table 1. Our work embodied the methodology described in the
following step-wise procedure:
Factory reset: To ensure no external variables affected our re-
sults, a factory reset and formatting of all devices and cardswas ﬁrst
employed (Section Factory reset).
Scenerio creation: The drone was powered on, ﬂown in two
separate geographical locations, and then powered off (Section
Scenario creation).
Data acquisition: The process of acquiring datawas broken into
three parts: drone, controller, and phone/tablet (Section Data
acquisition).
Data analysis: The acquired datawas analyzed. Particularly, two
ﬁles of interest containing ﬂight data were acquired. An in-depth
analysis of these ﬁles and their structures was attempted (Section
Data analysis).
Tool creation: Once the data was analyzed, and the proprietary
ﬁle structures were understood, a tool was created to enable ex-
aminers to parse evidentiary ﬁles (Section Tool creation: DRone
Open source Parser (DROP)).
Testing: Finally, a number of tests were conducted to validate our
constructed tool andﬁndings. Testswere also carriedoutwith regards
to the internal SD card in the drone (Section Testing and ﬁndings).
Factory reset
The ﬁrst step in the process was to factory reset both the drone
and the Nexus 7 tablet. The tablet was factory reset by booting into
the device recovery menu and selecting Factory Reset. The tablet
was then updated to the latest operating system e Android 6.0.1.
Next, the drone was factory reset using a secondary Android device
with DJI GO installed. DJI GO is the Android application developed
by DJI which serves as a command and control dashboard for the
Phantom III. This application allowed the user to control the drone,
in part, from a mobile device or tablet. It also allowed the user to
clear both the ﬂight route data and the video cache from the
nonvolatile internal storage device on the drone. As an extra pre-
caution, the 64 GB external SD card located on the camera rig was
deleted and formatted to a FAT32 ﬁle system.
Scenario creation
Next, the DJI GO applicationwas installed on the Android tablet,
and two test ﬂights were conducted. These ﬂights were made on
our campus grounds. The ﬂights were documented; keeping track
of date and time of ﬂight and ﬂight patterns. Data was recorded
using the drone and manually by the researchers to account for all
ﬂight events.
1 https://datﬁle.net/ (last seen 2016-10-03).
2 https://datﬁle.net/csvDownloads.html (last seen 2016-10-03).
3 https://healthydrones.com (last seen 2016-10-03).
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Data acquisition
Imaging external SD card
Once the test ﬂights were completed, the acquisition of data
commenced. We began by taking a physical image of the 64 GB
external SD card used by the Gimbal camera system to store images
and video. With the drone and remote turned off, we extracted the
micro SD card from the Gimbal rig and inserted it into a Cellebrite
write blocker. The MD5 hash was generated and stored. Then, using
the disk dump (dd) utility, the entire disk was dumped to an image
ﬁle and hashes were compared and veriﬁed.
Subsequently, the image ﬁle was opened in FTKImager 3.1.1
where the content of the image was examined and extracted to
another folder (Autopsy 4.1.1 was used to cross-validate ﬁndings).
The extracted ﬁles included images and videos taken throughout
the ﬂights as well as some ﬁles with metadata about the videos.
Results are shared in more detail in Section Testing and ﬁndings.
Android backup
Attentionwas then turned to the Nexus 7 tablet which acted as a
control station and dashboard for the drone. It displayed the live
camera feed, battery information, GPS, and allowed the user to
issue commands such as automated take off and landing. Android
backups consist of primarily application related artifacts and typi-
cally provide data pertaining to the ownership and usage of the DJI
GO application. A logical backup was executed using adb backup
-all and Android Backup Extractor by Elenkov (2014) was used to
extract the resulting backup.ab ﬁle to a .tar ﬁle. 7zip was then
used to decompress the ﬁle to a directory containing the ﬁles
pertaining to each application installed on the tablet, which
included ﬁles for the DJI GO application located in apps/dji.pilot.
Onemay also want to create a physical image of the Android device,
but it was unnecessary as wewere attempting to locate logical data
on the device.
Android storage
While the Android backup was useful in acquiring application
data, the user data must be obtained through the mobile device's
nonvolatile internal storage. To do this, the devicewas connected to
the forensic workstation and all of the ﬁles located on the internal
storage were selected and copied to the computer. The internal
storage contained several directories pertaining to DJI and these
were analyzed for relevant artifacts.
Acquiring the drone's storage
The last stage of the data acquisition was to obtain the ﬂight
records from the drone's nonvolatile internal storage. This was
conducted using three different methods:
1. Mounted the drone's internal storage to the forensic worksta-
tion via the DJI GO application and manually copied the ﬁles to
the forensic workstation. We note that the internal storage was
mounted as read only. Our tests showed that this method may
not be forensically sound as the drone has to be turned on
(Section Acquisition testing).
2. This step is identical to the ﬁrst except that now we acquire a
physical image of the internal storage using dd. Note, the same
limitations apply.
3. For this method, the actual nonvolatile internal storage medium
was pulled from the drone and forensically acquired. This
involved disassembling the drone, disconnecting several wires,
and cutting away the glue that was intended to permanently
hold the internal SD card in place. The socket for the SD card on
the drone is shown in Fig. 1. Our tests showed that this was the
most forensically sound acquisition method.
Data analysis
There were two primary sources for ﬂight data from the DJI
Phantom III. These include TXT ﬁles created by the DJI GO mobile
application and stored on the mobile device and DAT ﬁles created
by the drone itself and located on the drone's nonvolatile internal
storage. Both ﬁles are encrypted and encoded using two different
proprietary formats. After decrypting and decoding these ﬁles, data
regarding the GPS, motors, remote control, ﬂight status, and other
information can be extracted. These ﬁles essentially serve as the
electronic ﬂight recorder for the drone.
Table 1
Apparatus.
Tool Description Utilization
Flight system
DJI Phantom III Standard Quadcopter Serial# CL03021337
DJI remote control Remote control Flight control
Mobile device (Nexus 7 (2013) Tablet
Android OS V6.0.)
GPS/Heads up display Navigation
DJI GO App V3.0.0 Real time video connection Live video feed
Forensic analysis tools
Forensic workstation Mac OSX/MS Windows 10 Test bench
Memory Card Reader CelebritedUFED S/N 1004922 Hardware write blocker/Memory card reader
DROP Tool V0.1 DAT/Text ﬁle tool Decode DAT ﬁles/ﬁle correlation
NMAP V7.3 Network scanner Identify open ports on ﬂight system network
Hex editor version 1.7.7.0 Hex editor Reverse engineering
IDA Pro V6.8 Dis-assembler Reverse engineering
FTK Imager Lite V3.1.1 Forensic Imager Imaging/Hashing
Autopsy 4.1.1 Forensic analysis tool Cross validation of results
7Zip 16.03 Compression/decompression Extract select ﬁles
Android Backup Extractor Decompression tool Extract backup ﬁles
JD-GUI V1.0.0 Java source code viewer View Java source code of .class ﬁles
adb (Adroid Debug Bridge) communication with android system Communicate mobile device
SQLite Manager V0.8.3.1 Firefox plugin SQL Lite DB viewer
Tools used for disassembly
Metric Allen Key set Size 2 mm Separate drone body
General Tools 63518 Eighteen-Piece
Precision Screwdriver Set
Micro Phillips Flathead, and Torx bits Circuit board removal, shell separation, and motor removal
Dremel rotary tool Electric drill Removing plastic tabs that hold the ﬂight lights in
Knife Utility knife Cutting away the glue from the SD card holder
D.R. Clark et al. / Digital Investigation 22 (2017) S3eS14S6
DJI GO ﬂight record TXT ﬁles
While analyzing the ﬁles from the Android device's nonvolatile
internal storage, several TXT ﬁles containing ﬂight data were
discovered. These ﬁles were found in InternalStorage/DJI/
dji.pilot/FlightRecord/. The ﬁles were named using a
standard naming convention of DJIFlightRecord_
YYYY-MM-DD_[HH-MM-SS].txt. The date and time within the ﬁle
name corresponds to the date and time that the drone ﬂight began.
This ﬁle contains data regarding location, ﬂight status, battery
levels, and more in the form of packets. These packets must be
decrypted and decoded.
DJI GO TXT ﬁle structure
Knowing that these text ﬁles are created by the DJI GO applica-
tion we focused on trying to reverse engineer the android applica-
tion to ascertain the ﬁle structure. The ofﬁcial DJI GO applicationwas
downloaded4 and decompiled using JD-GUI.5 With this program, all
the java class ﬁles became visible. Although many variables, func-
tions, and class names were obfuscated, key words could be
searched for. A search for “FlightRecord” (the name of the directory
where the TXT ﬁles are stored) pointed us to k.class inside the
dji.pilot.fpv.model package of classes2.jar. k.class handled
the ﬂight record ﬁle writing process. Through manual inspection of
the ﬁle writing process within the Android application and the TXT
ﬁle itself using a hex editor, we concluded that the ﬁle follows a
structure. The high level ﬁle structure is shown in Fig. 2. It is
important to note that data in this ﬁle was in little Endian.
The last 190 bytes of the ﬁle contain general information about
the aircraft and ﬂight. The ﬁrst piece of information is an optional
geotag in plain text for where the ﬂight took place. For example,
many of our ﬁles read “New Haven, Connecticut.” The next bit of
recognizable data comes several bytes later and states the drone's
name in plain text as seen here:
Yuhe's Phantom3
03Z0600080
CL03021337
05LD102XHR
1153516293
This is the name assigned by the user during the set up process
alongwith themodel name, where “Yuhe” is the name of the owner
of the drone. This is followed by what appears to be four identiﬁ-
cation numbers. The same four numbers were also found in the
dji_pilot_publics_model_DJIDeviceInfoStatModel table
of dji.db. We discovered that these are actually serial numbers
and through inspection of the application in JD-GUI, we were able
to correlate the serial numbers to hardware devices.
The ﬁrst number can be traced to the Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU) located inside the drone. Serial number CL03021337 rep-
resents the camera. The third number can be traced back to the
primary circuit board inside the remote control that was used to
control the drone. This board is actually responsible for trans-
mitting the on-screen data to the mobile device. The last number,
1153516293 belonged to the battery.
TXT packet structure
Flight record data is written to TXT ﬁles in the form of packets,
the general structure of which is speciﬁed in Fig. 3.
The payload of the packet is encrypted and encoded. At the time
of writing there was no published method of decrypting this
payload, but during the process of reverse engineering the DJI GO
Android application, we were able to locate a library DJI
GO_v2.9.1_apkpure.com 2/lib/armeabi-v7a/libFREncry
pt.so, which is a proprietary library used to encrypt and decrypt
the ﬂight record data for the TXT ﬁles. So far, not much has been
published on this library, however, somework has been done trying
to reverse engineer it. We have been able to isolate the encryption
and decryption functions using IDA-Pro and are currently in the
Fig. 1. Extracting the Phantom III internal SD card from the bottom of the drone's main internal PC board.
4 https://apkpure.com/dji-go/dji.pilot (last seen 2016-10-03).
5 http://jd.benow.ca/ (last seen 2016-10-03).
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process of tracing the program stack to understand the input pa-
rameters of the function.
DJI drone DAT ﬁles
During the work on the drone several proprietary DAT ﬁles were
discovered on the 4 GB nonvolatile internal storage of the drone.
These ﬁles followed a common naming convention of FLY###.-
DAT, where the “###” is a successive number. This type of ﬁle
contains a large chunk of ﬂight data related to the drone's location,
ﬂight status, and various sensor readings.
DJI DAT ﬁle structure
After extracting the ﬁles from the drone's internal SD card
(FAT32 ﬁle system), some preliminary work was conducted in an
attempt to read the ﬁle. It was quickly determined that the ﬁle was
encoded and would require decoding. Little ofﬁcial documentation
was found related to DJI's DAT ﬁles. However, there is a large
amount of conversation about these ﬁles, as well as several tools
created by hobbyists that attempt to decode the ﬁles. In particular a
tool called DatCon6 yields the most comprehensive output from the
ﬁles. However, not all ﬁelds are decoded. DatCon provided a means
to parse the information from the binary DAT ﬁle and export it to a
human readable CSV ﬁle. DatCon was downloaded as a jar execut-
able and by decompiling the jar ﬁle, we were able to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of the DAT ﬁle structure. The high-
level DJI DAT ﬁle structure is depicted in Fig. 4.
The overall ﬁle layout is fairly simple. The ﬁrst 128 bytes of the
ﬁle represent the header. Bytes 16e20 contain the word “BUILD”
followed by the date and time of the build. We are uncertain of
what this build date actually refers to, but it is suspected that it
refers to the date of the last revision made to the ﬁle structure. The
parsing tool we discuss later actually uses the word “BUILD” as an
indicator to make sure that the ﬁle being read is in fact a DJI DAT
ﬁle. Byte 128 is the beginning of the data packets. Data packets are
written to the ﬁle as packed binary structures which are pro-
prietary to DJI. These packets make up the bulk of the ﬁle and then
the ﬁle ends with a varying number of bytes containing all 0's.
DAT packet structure
The data packets are structures of varying length depending on
the type of data being written. Although they are different lengths,
they do follow a common structure. Fig. 5 shows the basic structure
of the data packet.
It is important to note that the packet length refers to the entire
length of the packet, which includes the start byte to the last byte in
the payload. The tick number is four bytes representing the internal
bus clock tick number and comes after the message byte. The
payload can be anywhere from 14 to 245 bytes in length. This is
where the major variance is between each packet. The packet type
and sub-type correspond to the format of the payload.
Packet payload structure
The packet payload is the part of the packet that contains the
actual sensor and telemetry data. The payload can be anywhere from
14 to 245 bytes long and the type of payload is determined by the
packet type and sub-type. As this is beyond the paper's scope, a full
breakdown of the individual payloads can be downloaded.7 In Fig. 5
there are nine different packet types they areGPS,motor, homepoint,
remote control, tablet location, battery, attitude, ﬂight status, and
advanced battery. The GPS payload is the one we know the most
about at this point. It contains the GPS location of the drone as it
moves through the ﬂight, altitude, 3-axis acceleration, gyro, velocity,
magnetometer, and more. There are four bytes at the end of this
payload that appear to contain data, but it has not been determined
what that data is. Themotor and tablet location packet types are two
that have not been seen up to this point. Based on the DatCon code,
the motor payload contains both the speed and the load of all four
motors on the drone. The Phantom III Standard, however, does not
report these values, and thuswehave not seen these types of packets.
The tablet location reports the latitude and longitude of the tablet
only during a “Follow Me” mission. This is an auto pilot mode which
canbe enabled in theDJI GO applicationwhere the drone follows you.
The home point of the drone is usually automatically set by the
DJI GO application, but the user is also able to manually set this if
they wish. Home point coordinates are reported in the home point
payload. Remote control status such as throttle, rudder and elevator
are recorded by the remote control payloads. There are two types of
packets that carry battery information (battery and advanced bat-
tery), where one appears to contain information about just the
overall battery level and the other reports much more detailed
information about the battery capacity, temperature, current, and
voltage for the individual cells.
Fig. 2. Breakdown of TXT ﬁle structure.
Fig. 3. Breakdown of TXT packet structure.
6 https://datﬁle.net/index.html (last seen 2016-10-03).
7 https://github.com/unhcfreg/DROP/blob/master/MesssageStructure.xlsx (last
seen 2016-10-03).
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The last two payload types contain data about the Gimbal
camera mount and overall ﬂight status. The Gimbal payload con-
tains the positioning of the camera itself. The ﬂight status yields
information regarding the state of the ﬂight (autopilot, assisted
take off, go home, hover, etc.), and GPS related errors. This
packet also contains the ﬂight time inmilliseconds since the start of
the ﬂight. We demonstrate in the following section that this ﬂight
time, along with other metrics, can be used to correlate DAT ﬁles to
TXT ﬁles. This is particularly useful in determining the UNIX time at
which events occurred in the DAT ﬁle.
Tool creation: DRone Open source Parser (DROP)
DROP, or DRone Open source Parser is a command line forensic
tool we constructed in Python 3.4 to parse data from the DJI DAT
ﬁles. This tool works with Python 3.4 and is largely based on
reverse engineering DatCon. It has only been tested on DAT ﬁles
from the DJI Phantom III Standard, but is expected to also work for
the Phantom III Advanced, Professional, and the Inspire 1.
Tool usage
DROP provides two primary functions:
1. Parse data from DJI DAT ﬁles
2. Correlate DAT ﬁles to TXT ﬁles
DROP can be used to process either single DAT ﬁles or run a
batch of DAT ﬁles. This is dictated by the input parameters given at
execution. DROP's usage is as follows:
python DROP.py input [-h] [-o OUTPUT] [-t T] [-f]
The input parameter must be speciﬁed as either a directory
containing DAT ﬁles or a single DAT ﬁle. The output parameter
-o is used to specify the output destination. The -t is for
specifying a path to a directory containing DJI ﬂight record CSV
or a single ﬂight record CSV ﬁle. The -f ﬂag can be set to indicate
that DROP should process the ﬁle(s) even if they are not of the
standard DJI DAT ﬁle type. Lastly, there is a -h ﬂag which can be
used to print the list of input parameters for quick reference.
More information on DROP can be found in the DROP readme
ﬁle.8
Main function e data parsing
Pseudo code for the main function of DROP is depicted in Al-
gorithm LABEL:packetDecode. This method begins by checking the
system for ﬁle metadata. This is used to obtain the ﬁle size. This
data and more are logged in a separate text ﬁle (not shown) for
record keeping purposes. After the metadata is recorded, the input
ﬁle is opened to determine if it is a DJI DAT ﬁle format. It does this
Fig. 4. Basic structure of DJI DAT ﬁles.
Fig. 5. Breakdown of DAT ﬁle structure.
8 https://github.com/unhcfreg/DROP (last seen 2016-10-03).
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by ﬁrst extracting the 128 byte ﬁle header and then checking bytes
16e20 for the word “BUILD”. If it ﬁnds the word “BUILD” the pro-
gram continues; otherwise it exits.
If the ﬁle is determined to be a DJI DAT ﬁle, the program con-
tinues by reading the next byte (byte 128) from the ﬁle and creates
a new Message instance. If the ﬁle is determined to be of some
other type, a counter for non-DAT ﬁles is incremented. message is
an object that represents the current state of the drone by taking in
packets and storing the most recent values. The program then en-
ters a loop which terminates at the end of the ﬁle. This loop cycles
through the remaining bytes in the ﬁle, extracting the packet
length, header, and payload for each packet and updating message
with the latest data.
It was discussed earlier that packets can come in many forms,
with the primary difference being the payload. Multiple packets
may have the same tick number, meaning they were written to
the ﬁle at the same time. However, all of the packet types are
updated at different intervals, and so it is highly unlikely to see
one of every type of packet for a single tick number. The mes-
sage object is updated with the latest data rather than reset so
that the output to outputFile contains the most up-to-date
information for all of the ﬁelds for each tick number. This is
done using the addPacket() method of message which han-
dles decoding and parsing the data from the payload. This is
further discussed in 6.2.1. In our algorithm, we write a row to
outputFile each time we see the tick number change, so long
as there was data added for that tick number. It is possible (and
likely) to see tick numbers skipped all together because packets
were read in, but none of them contained data that we know
how to parse. If at any point a packet is determined to be
fundamentally corrupt (not following the established DJI packet
format), a corrupt packet counter is incremented. If a packet is of
the correct DJI packet format but contains data we do not know
how to parse (unrecognized packet type), then an unknown
packet counter is incremented. After the end of the ﬁle is
reached, the last row is written to outputFile and the input
and output ﬁles are closed. After the processing has completed,
various statistics about each ﬁle processed are written to
processlog.txt. This includes statistics such as date and time
processed, total number of records, number of corrupt/unrecog-
nized records encountered, and more.
Decrypting and parsing payload data
When data from a new payload is added to message, the
payload must ﬁrst be decrypted using the scheme in Algorithm
LABEL:payloadDecrypt. The decryption algorithm was observed
through reverse engineering of DatCon. This method takes the
payload and tick number as input parameters and attempts to
decrypt the payload. First, the key must be generated by taking the
modulo of the tick number and 256. An empty list is then created
which will hold the decrypted version of the payload once ﬁnished.
Next, each byte in the payload is iterated through. Each byte is
XORed with the key that was generated previously, and the result is
appended to the decrypted payload list. Once each byte in the
payload has been processed, the decrypted version of the payload is
returned. It may be observed that the encryption algorithm is a very
easy scheme to reverse engineer. At this time, we do not know why
DJI chose such a simple algorithm.
Once the payload is decrypted, the data can be decoded ac-
cording to the structures. All of the necessary information is pub-
lished online in the DROP GitHub repository https://github.com/
unhcfreg/DROP. This was done by unpacking the bytes from the
payload into their intended data types which may include short,
double, ﬂoat, bytes, and more. Several courtesy calculations are
performed at this stage as well. These are calculations that produce
values which are not directly available from the payload itself, but
are helpful for reference. Examples of this include calculating the
watts using the voltage and current, or the total acceleration from
the three axis acceleration values.
File correlation
An additional function built in the tool is the ability to correlate
the generated TXT ﬁles found on the Android mobile device to their
corresponding DAT ﬁles. This correlation is conducted in two steps
accomplished with the algorithm shown in Algorithm 3.
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We ﬁrst identify common ﬂight times that exist in both the TXT
ﬁle and the DAT ﬁle. The ﬂight time is just a measurement of the
number of milliseconds that have passed since the drone took ﬂight.
Next, for eachmatchingﬂight time,we compared theGPS coordinates
from the same row. If the latitude and longitude values from the DAT
ﬁle and the TXT ﬁle were the same out to 5 decimal places, a counter
was incremented.We chose tomatch out to 5 decimal places because
we ran a test using a known correlating DAT and TXT ﬁle pair. In this
test we calculated the average number of decimal places that the co-
ordinatesmatch on and found that on average theymatch out to 5.51
decimal places. The standard deviation of these two data sets of GPS
coordinates was approximately ± 1.5. Once all of the GPS coordinates
have been processed, a ﬁnal conﬁdence level (as a percentage) is
calculatedbydividing thenumberofGPSmatchesby the totalnumber
of ﬂight timematches. This method has been effective for correlating
DAT ﬁles with TXT ﬁles and has been tested for several ﬂights.
This correlation method does pose challenges when the ﬂight
pattern and general GPS locations of two separate ﬂights are very
similar to each other. One way we can get around this is to add
more metrics to correlate on. This involves comparing things like
altitude, battery voltage, and number of satellites. We have been
able to show that extracted data match nearly one to one for a DAT
ﬁle and corresponding TXT ﬁle. See Appendix B for a graphical
representation of data extracted from DAT versus TXT ﬁles.
Testing and ﬁndings
In this section different tests are performed to explore the
forensic soundness of acquisition methods and verify that DROP is
forensically sound, and will behave as expected. File hashing was
conducted as a basic means to verify ﬁles are not modiﬁed. Sample
corrupt ﬁles were sent through the tool as well to examine the
tool's robustness. We also tested the effects of a full or missing SD
card for the drone's nonvolatile internal storage.
Acquisition testing
The differences in the three acquisition methods in section Data
acquisition are subtle, but comparing the results from each pro-
vided us with valuable insight about how the drone's nonvolatile
internal storage was managed as well as the forensic soundness of
each method.
Overall, our results indicated that turning on the drone affect's
the integrity of the evidence on the drone's internal storage. Basi-
cally, every time the drone is turned on, a new DAT ﬁle is created.
Therefore, using any acquisition method that required the drone to
be on was deemed unsound. Furthermore, we note that other tests
were conducted that affect the acquisition of the drone's internal
storage. We noticed that if the drone's SD card was at or near full,
turning the drone on immediately wiped data (in an irrecoverable
manner), thus, affecting the integrity of potentially relevant evi-
dence. The threshold for maximum allowable used space before
wiping was not determined during the course of our tests.
File integrity tests
Given that DROPwas designed to be used in a potential forensics
case it was necessary to verify that the tool did not alter the DAT
ﬁles in any way. This was accomplished by hashing the ﬁles to be
parsed before and after they were parsed by DROP.
File under test: FLY037.DAT
File hashes:
Library copy: 1804a65d9d97833c6f06adf2e9bd8dbe
After DatCon: 1804a65d9d97833c6f06adf2e9bd8dbe
After DROP: 1804a65d9d97833c6f06adf2e9bd8dbe
By observation, it is apparent that the hashes of DAT ﬁle
FLY037.DAT before and after tool usage match. Both DatCon and
DROP were tested for this. Unlike DatCon, DROP automatically
calculates and displays the MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256 hash digests
before the ﬁle under test is opened and after it is closed. It will also
automatically perform the comparison of the hashes and alert the
user as to whether or not the hashes matched.
DAT ﬁle testing
To test the robustness of DROP and DatCon, we created a set of
corrupt DAT ﬁles whichwere all derivatives of one known goodDAT
ﬁle. Thirteen ﬁles in total were created, each with unique issues.
Tests included removing bytes from the header, changing a packet's
start byte value, removing bytes from a payload, and more. Details
and results for all of the tests that were performed are shown in
Appendix A. This set of tests is comprehensive, but not necessarily
complete. More tests could potentially be executed to examine how
the software reacts to for example running these tests on every
packet in a ﬁle, but we deemed this as outside the scope of our
testing. Overall, both DatCon and DROP performed equally, with the
two exceptions. First, DROP, provided valuable feedback to the user
on parsing challenges faced, whereas DatCon did not.
Second, further testing indicated that DatCon was missing data
when parsing DAT ﬁles. DatCon will only parse data at a given tick
offset time sample frequency. The tick offset time is the number of
seconds passed since the beginning of the recording and is calcu-
lated using the Central Processing Unit (CPU) tick number. Being
that DAT ﬁles usually contain an overwhelming amount of data
packets, DatCon incorporated a feature to allow the user to set the
packet sample frequency (packets per second). This effectively
adjusts the output resolution of the DAT ﬁle. Currently, the fastest
sample rate the user can select is 200 Hz. However, even with the
frequency set at the maximum possible rate, DatCon still fails to
output one in ﬁve records from the DAT ﬁle. Conversely, DROP
outputs every packet that is found and does not have a method of
setting the sample frequency. This is to say that for every ﬁve re-
cords outputted by DROP, DatCon will only output four of them.
Drone internal SD card tests
While working with the DAT ﬁles we became curious about the
limitations of the drone's internal SD card which was formatted as
FAT32. Speciﬁcally wewanted to explore the effects of ﬁlling the SD
card to capacity. We began with an inspection of the SD card
extracted from the drone. The card had 39 DAT ﬁles numbered from
145 to 181. The card had approximately 1182.13 MB of free space. A
python script was constructed to analyze the free space left on the
card and then create a ﬁle of exactly that size in order to ﬁll the card
to capacity. With the card at capacity, it was inserted back into the
drone and the drone was turned on. After several seconds, it was
turned off and the SD card was extracted for analysis. Inspection
showed that 12 ﬁles were deleted. These were ﬁles 145 to 157
which were the oldest DAT ﬁles on the card. Moreover, the ﬁle
pointers were not just deleted, the drive space previously occupied
by these ﬁles was zeroed out, eliminating all chances of recovery.
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Our last test involved ﬂying the drone without the SD card. It
was discovered that the drone would in fact ﬂy without an SD card.
This may be used as an anti forensics mechanism by adversaries. In
an effort to simply and succinctly convey the data acquisition
process that should be followed by investigators, we propose the
ﬂow diagram in Fig. 6 be used.
DAT and TXT ﬁle correlation tests
To externally validate our data parsing method using DROP, we
chose to use the TXT ﬁle parser by healthydrones.com. The ideawas
to explore if data extracted by our parser on the DAT ﬁle (extracted
from the actual drone's SD card) matched closely to the data parsed
from the TXT ﬁle located on the Android device used to control the
drone. Our ﬁndings indicated that DROP produced results that were
almost a one-to-one match as shown in Appendix A. As shown in
the graphs, the data from both the TXT ﬁles as well as the DAT ﬁle
follow similar trends. The standard deviation for these three cor-
relations were found to be near zero and can be seen in Table 2. The
cause of the differences between DAT and TXT ﬁles has yet to be
determined.
Forensically relevant ﬁndings
Forensic analysis of the DJI Phantom III yielded valuable forensic
data such as GPS locations, WiFi connections, user information,
dates and times etc., each extracted from a variety of data sources.
Table 3 summarizes forensically relevant artifacts.
Limitations
As discussed at the beginning of this paper in Section Research
scope, our research focused on just the DJI Phantom III. We realize
that this work does not encompass a complete understanding of
forensics for all consumer drones, but it does provide a good starting
point. DJI currently holds the largest market share in the US for
drone sales, thus validating our focus. Furthermore, based on the
amount of research and time involved with performing a thorough
forensic analysis, it is currently unrealistic to try and cover all or even
a majority of consumer drones. All we can do at this point is to
continue research in the area of drone forensics as well as push
manufacturers to agree on a standard for recording ﬂight data.
In regards to our tool, DROP, the biggest limitation is that both
DAT ﬁles and TXT ﬁles are proprietary. We have not captured the
full spectrum of potential data that may be extracted fromDAT ﬁles,
and as such, is a limitation of this work.
Conclusions & future work
While much work has been conducted with regards to security
of drones, little work has been published with regards to the
forensic analysis of drones. As these devices continue to grow in
capabilities it will become necessary to have a forensic method for
acquisition and analysis grounded by science and robust testing.
The work accomplished in Section Methodology begins to develop
this process. It shows that it is possible to identify locations and
times of the drone, along with additional forensically relevant data
of value to a potential case. The methods developed in this research
were scrutinized for forensic soundness. Furthermore, our results
Fig. 6. DJI Phantom III data acquisition process.
Table 2
DAT and TXT ﬁle correlation standard deviations.
Metric Standard deviation
Latitude & Longitude 0.00000499
Number of satellites 0.555
Battery voltage 0.0849
Table 3
Summary of forensically relevant ﬁndings.
Finding Description Utilization
General ﬁndings
External MicroSD card (64 GB) Gimbal memory Photo & video
Internal MicroSD card (4 GB) Drone main board removable memory Flight stats
Mobile device Flight system feedback Autopilot, pictures, GPS
External MicroSD
Pictures/ /DJI_####.jpg EXIF data (date/time, pitch, roll and yaw of Gimbal
and aircraft)
Videos/ /DJI_####.m4v, /idx## Metadata (ﬁle headers contained location of drone
and GPS data)
Internal MicroSD
DAT ﬁles/ /FLY###.DAT Flight information (GPS, compass, battery, etc)
Nexus Tablet
\apps\dji.pilot\db\dji.db Pertinent ﬂight and user information No-ﬂy zones, user email addresses, last known
home point
\apps\dji.pilot\sp\dji.pilot.xml device ID device serial numbers, last ﬂight location
\InternalStorage\DJI\dji.pilot\FlightRecord DJIFlightRecord_YYYY-MM-DD_[HH-MM-SS].txt Flight information (GPS, compass, battery, etc), user
name, device serial numbers
\com.android.providers.settings\f\flattened-data Credentials/SSID WiFi credentials, user home address via access point
identiﬁcation
\Internalstorage\DJI\dji.pilot\CACHE_IMAGE Images/EXIF data Cached images from MicroSD on gimbal assembly
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showed that we can link a speciﬁc drone based on its serial number
to a mobile device that is controlling it.
While our work focused on the DJI Phantom III, more work
needs to be conducted across the spectrum of drones available for
consumers today, including the recently released Phantom IV.
Future work should focus on attempting to demystify the DAT and
TXT ﬁle structures. Furthermore, our team did attempt to reverse
engineer the ﬁrmware on the drone, but more work needs to be
pursued on that front. This could shed some light on data this work
was not capable of parsing. Lastly, it would be of relevance to
develop a tool to map location over time given a starting point and
accelerometer data from the DAT ﬁles stored on the drone. More
work should also be conducted on other areas that may hold data of
evidentiary value located on the drone, especially since our work
showed that potential adversaries are capable of ﬂying the drone
even after removing its nonvolatile internal storage.
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A. Correlation data DAT vs. TXT
 See Fig. 7 for GPS coordinates correlation.
 See Fig. 8 for satellite correlation.
 See Fig. 9 for battery correlation.
Fig. 7. Latitude Longitude DAT vs. TXT.
Fig. 8. Satellites DAT vs. TXT.
Fig. 9. Battery DAT vs. TXT.
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B. Corrupt data test results
 See Table 4 for corrupt data testing information.
Table 4
Corrupt data test results.
File description DROP results DatCon results
Original ﬁle Runs as expected. Runs as expected.
Removed 790 bytes starting at byte
128 offset from the beginning of
the ﬁle.
Runs as expected. Runs as expected.
Modiﬁed “BUILD” in ﬁle header e
removed it completely
still processed if the force ﬂag has been set, but it starts looking
for packets at the beginning of the ﬁle. Output matches original.
Completely refused to process the ﬁle.
Short File. Removed from byte
7271872 to the end.
DROP processed the data up to record 970326 (The last existing
record).
Missed one record at the end (due to sample frequency).
Removed bytes 65e93 from header. Processed the ﬁle but missed the data in the ﬁrst packet (tick
number 970323).
Processed the ﬁle but missed the data in the ﬁrst packet (tick
number 970323).
Changed the start byte of message
970326 to 0x66.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and output 0's for this tick number.
Changed message type from CF 01
to CF 32 of message 970326.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and output 0's for this tick number.
Changed packet length from 84 to
67.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and output 0's for this tick number.
Changed packet length from 84 to
92.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Changed padding in packet header
from 0x00 to 0xAB
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Seems to have worked ﬁne, but hash of output does not match
that of the original output.
Removed packet header completely Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and output 0's for this tick number.
Removed bytes 36e73 of the
payload (1709e1746 overall)
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Added 10 random bytes to end of
payload: 59 4F 55 47 4F 54 48
41 4B 44
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and output 0's for this tick number.
Added 10 random bytes to start of
payload: 59 4F 55 47 4F 54 48
41 4B 44
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Processed the ﬁle but missed data for record 970326 GPS data
and did not output any data for this tick number.
Created a completely random
payload
Processed the ﬁle but output bad data for record 970326. Processed the ﬁle but output bad data for record 970326.
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